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ABSTRACT 
By the latter half of the 1980s, a number of Asia Pacific countries had 
succeeded through export strategies in penetrating the European market. 
While Japan was a net exporter to Europe throughout the 1980s, countries 
like Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and to a lesser extent, Malaysia, Thailand 
and the Philippines were also net exporters to Europe. As we move through 
the decade of the 1990s, one of the major uncertainties facing Asia Pacific 
countries centers on the possibility that, along with the creation of the single 
market, Europe may erect barriers to trade which could discriminate against 
non-member countries. Given the potential detrimental impact of a future 
discriminatory trade policy of the European Union with respect to its outside 
trading partners, this paper examines the historical relationship and 
importance of the EU market to selected Asia Pacific countries over the 9-
year period 1982 through 1990. In addition, the paper examines market 
entry strategies which may be useful for traditional Asia Pacific exporting 
companies given a potentially adverse European Union trade posture. 
Specifically, it is suggested that either a defensive export-substitution direct 
investment strategy or an offensive export-substitution direct investment 
strategy may be appropriate for many Asia Pacific companies. 
ABSTRAK 
Pada akhir pertengahan 1980an, beberapa negara Asia Pasific telah berjaya 
menembusi pasaran Eropah melalui strategi-strategi ekspot mereka. 
Disamping Jepun sebagai negara pengekspot bersih, terdapat negara-negara 
seperti Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong dan pada tahap yang agak rendah sedikit 
merangkumi negara-negara seperti Malaysia, Thailand, dan Filipina. Salah 
satu ketakpastian utama dalam memasuki dekad-dekad 1990an yang dihadapi 
oleh negara-negara Asia Pasifik berpusat kepada Eropah yang mungkin 
akan menubuhkan batasan perdagangan mereka, disamping penubuhan hanya 
satu pasaran, yang akan mendiskriminat negara-negara bukan ahli. 
Berdasarkan pada potensi kesan merugikan dari polisi perdagangan 
discriminatori ini terhadap rakan perdagangan luar Eropah, kertas kerja ini 
meneliti sejarah pertalian dan kepentingan pasaran Eropah kepada negara-
negara terpilih Asia Pasifik dalamjangka masa 9 tahun dari 1982 hingga ke 
1990. Kertas ini juga meneliti strategi-strategi memasuki pasaran yang 
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mungkin berguna untuk syarikat-syarikat tradisional Asia Pasifik dengan 
potensi wujudnya keburukan kedudukan perdagangan Persatuan Eropah. 
Khususnya, dicadangkan kesesuaian penggunaan Sama ada menggunakan 
strategi ekspot bertahan-gantian pelaburan langsung atau ekspot serangan-
gantian pelaburan langsung untuk kebanyakan syarikat Asia Pasifik. 
INTRODUCTION 
On June 14, 1985, the Commission of the European Communities submitted 
to the European Council its White Paper entitled "Completing the Internal 
Market." This report outlined a plan for the eventual formation of a single 
European market; a market where goods, services, capital, people and 
technology would be permitted to move freely across borders. A year later 
in 1986, when the twelve individual Common Market countries ratified the 
Single European Act, the forces were irreversibly put in place for the creation 
of a free internal market for Europe by the end of 1992. 
Even after 1992, Europe continues to shape its single internal market. In this 
context, Europe's common external trade policy, which would defme its trade 
posture and economic relations with non-member countries, is evolving. For 
non-member countries, a major unknown as this process unfolds is the extent 
to which the European Union's (EU) external trade policies will affect them 
commercially and financially. 
While the European Commission is still in the process of defining its 
external trade policy relative to non-member countries, some early 
announcements from the European Commission are worth noting. In October 
1988, the Commission in summarizing its discussions on the external dimension 
of the single European market wrote that "1992 will not be a fortress Europe 
but a partnership Europe" (The European communities commission 1988: 1). 
However, the Commission also stated that its policy guidelines would be the 
internationally accepted trade policy principles contained in both the General 
Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GAIT) and in the Organization For 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The Commission, in 
apparent reference to GAIT trade principles, noted that "the Community'S aim 
is to strengthen the concept of mutual benefits and reciprocity " (The 
European communities commission 1988:2). While the Commission has 
publicly rejected a mirror-image defmition of reciprocity, it has, unfortunately, 
in some areas, yet to provide non-member countries with its precise definition 
of the term. 
In addition to the reciprocity issue, non-member states have for many 
years voiced concerns about EU local content standards and rules of origin 
requirements, both of which will determine whether or not non-member 
company products will be guaranteed free circulation across the twelve ED 
country borders. Another concern centers on the long-standing quantitative 
Corporate Strategies/or Asia Pacific Companies 29 
restraints which EU member states have maintained against imports of 
selected foreign products, which by one count totaled over 1,000 by 1990 
(Kenjiro Ishikawa 1990). 
According to Henderson (1989), the Community's trade policy has 
traditionally involved widespread recourse to protectionism and discrimination 
over the last twenty years. In Henderson's view, EU trade policy "is now 
more protectionist than it was fifteen to twenty years ago" and "is not 
currently becoming less so" (Group of thirty 1989). Finally, some observers 
have suggested that in light of the questionable global competitiveness of 
many European industries, the Commission, under pressure from some of its 
less efficient member countries, may actually strengthen its protectionist 
tendency. 
In summary, the concerns which have been expressed by non-member 
states focus on the possibility that, along with the evolution of the single 
European market, Europe might intensify barriers to commerce and investment 
which could discriminate against non-members. Given that the Community's 
external trade policy continues to evolve, it is no wonder the view of many 
non-member countries has ranged from concern to skepticism i It is apparent 
that, within this environment, corporate strategies for non-member country 
companies will require close examination if non-member ftrms are to remain 
or become competitive in the single European market. 
THE EU AND THE ASIA PACIFIC REGION: 
AN OVERALL ASSESSMENT 
One way to assess the importance of the relationship of the EU to the 
economies of the Asia Paciftc is to examine historical trade account data. 
Utilizing the International Monetary Fund's Direction Of Trade Statistics, EU 
related trade data were analyzed for the following twelve Asia Pacific 
countries: Australia, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, New 
Zealand, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand. Data 
examined covered the 9-year time period 1982 through 1990. 
As shown in Table 1, during the period under examination, e,xports from 
the twelve Asia Paciftc countries to the EU market2 expanded rapidly, 
growing from $40.7 billion in 1982 to $121.5 billion by 1990. This 
represented an average annual growth rate in regional exports to the EU of 
about 24.9%. By comparison, Asia-Paciftc regional exports to the rest of the 
world (i.e., to non-EU countries) increased about 12.4% per year during the 
same period. 
Additionally, during the same 9-year period, the region's trade surplus 
with the EU expanded dramatically from $8.6 billion in 1982 to $21.8 billion 
in 1990. It is important to note that during the latter 1980s the Asia-Paciftc 
region was able to expand its trade surplus with the EU at the same time its 
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TABLE l. Asia Pacific Trade with The EU and The Rest of The World 
1982 Through 1990 (Millions of US dollars) 
Asia Pacific Region Trade Asia Pacific Trade with Ee Trade 
with the EU The Rest of the World Balance 
as 
% of 
Year Exports Imports Balance Exports Imports Balance World 
1990 $121,448 $ 99,604 $21,844 $310,993 $278,659 $32,334 67.7% 
1989 104,816 85,031 19,785 299,596 249,589 50,007 39.6 
1988 100,097 75,516 24,581 284,830 218,693 66,137 37.2 
1987 80,441 58,255 22,186 257,201 170,741 86,460 27.1 
1986 62,117 47,587 1-1,530 229,528 147,660 81,868 17.8 
1985 45,112 38,993 6,119 200,129 156,764 43,365 14.1 
1984 44,911 36,310 8,601 198,282 163,869 34,413 25.0 
1983 42,676 33,773 8,903 167,546 157,981 9,565 93.1 
1982 40,649 32,037 8,612 155,922 163,056 -7,134 
Averages: 
Year Exports Imports Balance 
1986-90 $93,748 $73,193 $20,585 
1982-85 $43,340 $35,278 $ 8,059 
Notes: 1. The rest of the world excludes the EU as well as intra-regional trade among 
the twelve Asia Pacific countries. Thus, it includes trade with other 
countries in Asia, Africa, North and South America and non-EU countries in Europe. 
2. Regional economies are represented by: Australia, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, 
Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and 
Thailand. 
Source: Direction of Trade Statistics, Yearbooks 1991, 1990, and 1989. 
trade surplus with the rest of the world was declining. By 1990, the region's 
trade surplus with the EU amounted to about two-thirds of its trade surplus 
with the rest of the world. 
A closer inspection of the Asia-Pacific region's trade data with the EU 
reveals two distinct periods in regional performance. The first period, from 
1982 through 1985, was one of relative stability both in Asia Pacific exports 
to the x and its trade balance with the Community. The second period, from 
1986 through 1990, witnessed substantial expansion both in the region's 
exports and trade surplus with the EU. As shown in Table 1, exports which 
averaged $43.3 billion during the first period, approximately doubled to 
$93.8 billion during the latter period. As for the region's trade surplus with 
the EU, it grew from an average of $8.1 billion over the 1982-85 period to 
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$20.6 billion during the latter five years. It is also interesting to note that 
during this turning point in Asia Pacific trade with the EU, the Commission's 
White Paper was introduced and important discussions about EU external 
trade policy began.3 
THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF THE EU TO THE ASIA PACIFIC 
REGION AND TO SPECIFIC COUNTRIES 
The relative importance of the EU market to Asia Pacific countries is noted 
in Table 2. As shown, by 1990, Asia Pacific exports to the twelve EU 
countries represented about 16.1% of the region's total (world) exports. A 
comparison of the 1982-85 and 1986-90 periods shows the run up in the 
relative importance of regional exports to the EU during the latter period, 
rising from an average of 12.1 % of total trade to 15.1 %. 
TABLE 2. The Relative Importance of EU Trade to the Asia Pacific Region 
(EU trade as a percent of total trade) 
Year Exports Imports 
1990 16.1% 14.1% 
1989 15.1 13.5 
1988 15.6 13.7 
1987 15.0 13.5 
1986 13.9 13.5 
1985 11.5 11.3 
1984 11.6 10.5 
1983 12.7 10.6 
1982 12.7 10.0 
Averages: 
1986-90 15.1% 13.7% 
1982-85 12.1% 10.6% 
Notes: Regional economies are represented by: Australia, China, Hong Kong, 
Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Singapore, South 
Korea, Taiwan and Thailand. 
Source: Direction of Trade Statistics, Yearbooks 1991, 1990, and 1989. 
Impressive as this regional data may be, however, regional averages tend 
to mask the importance of the EU market to individual Asia Pacific economies. 
To explore this issue, the twelve Asia Pacific countries were analyzed 
separately. Table 3 reports on the average growth rate of exports into and 
imports from the EU for the twelve Asia Pacific countries. The acceleration 
in both regional exports and individual country exports to the EU during the 
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latter half of the 1980s is documented in Table 3. As can be seen, all Asia 
Pacific countries experienced increases in their annual growth rates of 
exports to the EU during the 1985-90 period. For some Asia Pacific 
countries, the latter period was one of substantial export growth. Taiwan, 
Hong Kong and Thailand, in particular, experienced EU export growth in 
excess of 50% per year. 
TABLE 3. Annual Frowth Rate of Asia Pacific Exports 
to the EU 1982 - 1990 (Millions of us dollars) 
Country 1982-85 1985-90 1982-1990 
Australia 1.31% 13.10% 9.00% 
China 1.77 42.40 28.57 
Hong Kong 0.00 55.27 34.65 
Indonesia 8.61 32.27 28.61 
Japan 5.57 31.16 24.81 
Malaysia 6.86 19.58 17.33 
New Zealand -3.37 6.14 2.18 
Philippines -2.70 24.92 11.49 
Singapore 6.81 42.92 34.86 
South Korea 3.97 28.03 21.09 
Taiwan 4.94 58.33 43.70 
Thailand -5.63 50.29 24.01 
Region 3.66% 33.84% 24.85% 
Source: Direction of Trade Statistics, Yearbooks 1991, 1990, and 1989. 
Table 4 shows the relative importance of EU trade to each of the twelve 
Asia Pacific countries. The EU represented a substantial and growing portion 
of total foreign trade for some Asia Pacific countries. For example, during the 
1986-90 period, 20.7% of Thailand's exports went to the EU. For New 
Zealand and the Philippines, EU exports, as a percent of total exports, 
amounted to 18.4% and 17.9% respectively. Table 3 also reveals substantial 
increases in the EU export market for some regional countries. For example, 
from 1982-85 to 1986-90 Indonesia's EU export market doubled from 5.0% 
to 10.5% of its total exports. For Japan, EU exports increased from 12.5% 
to 17.2% of total exports. 
Finally, Table 5 documents the magnitude of EU exports and imports for 
individual Asia Pacific countries along with their trade balances. Taiwan, 
South Korea, and Hong Kong joined Japan as successful exporters to the EU 
during the latter 1980s. To a lesser extent, the Philippines, Malaysia and 
Thailand were also somewhat successful in penetrating the EU market. 
TABLE 4. The Relative Importance of EU Trade to Individual Asia Pacific 
Countries 1982-1985 and 1986-1990 (EU trade as a percent of total trade) 
1982-1985 1986-1990 
Country Exports Imports Exports Imports 
Australia 13.9% 21.7% 14.3% 23.1% 
China 9.6 13.8 10.3 15.5 
Hong Kong 14.8 11.6 15.8 10.3 
Indonesia 5.0 15.9 10.5 17.6 
Japan 12.5 6.8 17.2 13.1 
Malaysia 14.4 13.7 14.8 14.0 
New Zealand 20.4 20.3 18.4 20.8 
Philippines 15.0 10.9 17.9 11.3 
Singapore 10.0 10.7 13.2 12.3 
South Korea 11.9 8.7 12.9 11.1 
Taiwan 9.6 9.6 14.1 12.5 
Thailand 21.2 13.0 20.7 14.9 
Region 12.1% 10.6% 15.3% 13.7% 
Source: Direction of Trade Statistics, Yearbooks 1991, 1990, and 1989. 
TABLE 5. Trade Data of Asia Pacific Countries with the EU 
1982-85 and 1986-90 (Millions of US dollars) 
Average Annual Average Annual Average Annual 
Exports Imports Export Imports Trade Balance 
Country 1982-85 1982-90 1986-90 1986-90 1982-85 1986-90 
Australia $ 3,110 $ 4,912 $ 4,503 $ 7,601 $-1,802 $-3,098 
China 2,298 3,761 4,936 8,019 -1,463 -3,083 
Hong Kong 3,758 3,077 9,572 6,250 681 3,322 
Indonesia 1,041 2,285 2,087 2,704 -1,244 -617 
Japan 19,713 8,924 43,726 23,935 10,789 19,791 
Malaysia 2,086 1,785 3,177 2,578 301 599 
New Zealand 1,131 1,178 1,477 1,620 - 47 -143 
Philippines 746 759 1,196 1,016 -13 180 
Singapore 2,232 2,967 4,949 5,216 -735 -267 
South Korea 3,149 2,432 6,806 5,631 -717 1,175 
Taiwan 2,605 1,947 8,072 5,406 658 2,666 
Thailand 1,472 1,253 3,282 3,018 219 264 
Source: Direction of Trade Statistics, Yearbooks 1991, 1990 and 1989. 
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In summary, the infonnation presented suggests that during the 1980s, 
and specifically after 1985, the Asia Pacific region as a whole, as well as 
individual countries within the region, has developed an important and 
expanding trade relationship with the EU market. This observation would 
appear to support the contention that the adoption of a protectionist external 
trade policy by the EU would prove extremely costly for the Asia Pacific 
region as well as for specific countries. This seems especially relevant for 
those Asia Pacific countries which over the last decade or so have successfully 
utilized export driven policies to promote internal industrialization or those 
countries which are considering the use of such a macro-strategy. 
GLOBAL STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT 
Corporate strategy involves the planning, designing and managing of 
organizations so as to accomplish a purpose or achieve a goal. Organizations 
may have a multiplicity of purposes or goals, both of a financial and non-
financial nature. Financial goals include long-tenn profit maximization, 
earnings and sales growth, while non-fmancial goals involve corporate 
survival, defending pre-existing market share and penetrating new markets. 
According to Allio (1988), corporate strategy focuses on the way in which a 
finn allocates its resources so that it can best achieve its organizational goals. 
Davidson (1982) defines global strategy as the process of defining, 
developing, and administering a strategy and structure for a worldwide 
business (William H. Davidson 1982). As a general rule, it would appear 
that fonnulating a global corporate strategy is likely to be more complicated 
than a domestic strategy. This would be due to the expanded environment 
in which global finns operate. A global corporate strategy needs to confront 
an expanded set of external and internal issues including country risk, foreign 
exchange exposure, dealings with and competition from state-owned 
enterprises, pressures from host governments, patent and trademark protection, 
the integration of foreign and domestic units, the staffmg of overseas 
operations, control issues, differing legal environments, cross-cultural issues, 
and cross-border funds transfers, and resource allocation within the international 
family. 
CORPORATE STRATEGY AND EUROPE'S SINGLE INTEGRATED MARKET 
Given the premise stated earlier that Europe's evolving single integrated 
market may also result in external trade structure which will deny companies 
outside the region full access to the benefits of the integration effort, 
corporate strategies for non-resident firms can best be thought of in tenns of 
defending pre-existing EU market share or penetrating new EU markets. 
The idea behind either of these. strategies is that regional economic 
integration in Europe coupled with an uncertain, but potentially adverse, 
evolving external trade environment, may encourage direct foreign investment 
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into the EU. For those fIrms which have built up existing market share in the 
EU and wish to defend their market share, a strategy of switching from 
exporting into the region to direct foreign investment in the region may be 
termed defensive export substituting investment. Additionally, for those 
companies contemplating the EU market for the fIrst time and wishing to 
bypass an export strategy, an offensive export substituting policy may be 
appropriate. The distinction between a defensive and offensive export 
substitution strategy is that the former is intended to be defensive of pre-
existing market share while the latter is undertaken in anticipation of future 
market share. 
The assumption that non-resident corporations may adapt their 
organizational form to Europe's single integrated market is supported in the 
business strategy literature. Davidson argues that one key element in any 
fIrm's global strategy is the selection of an organizational structure. Day 
(1990) suggests that winning corporate strategies require successful adaptation 
to among other things impending threats. Within Day's context, defensive 
and offensive export substitution strategies can be viewed as a proactive 
response to the potential threats from Europe's single integrated market.4 
JAPANESE EXPORTS TO THE EU 
Throughout the period under examination, Japanese companies successfully 
penetrated into the EU market. As documented in Table 6, Japanese exports 
rose from $18.1 billion in 1982 to over $54 billion by 1990. This represented 
an average annual growth rate of Japanese exports to the EU of 24.8%. As 
with the region as a whole, Japanese exports to the EU accelerated in the latter 
half of the 1980s, when they grew at an annual rate of 31.2%. Japanese trade 
surplus with the EU also rose dramatically in the second half of the 1980s, 
practically doubling from an average trade balance of $10.8 billion in 1982-
85 to $19.8 billion in 1986-90. 
Given the performance of Japan with respect to the EU, it is not 
surprising that when one discusses Asia PacifIc - EU trade with EU officials 
or EU businesses, Japanese trade is what generally dominates that discussion. 
Furthermore, when protectionism measures in relation to the Asia PacifIc 
region are discussed, the enormous Japanese trade surplus with the EU is 
often cited as a supporting factor for such policies. 
JAPANESE DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE EU 
Traditionally, Japanese companies utilized a trade-based (or export-based) 
strategy rather than an investment-based strategy with regard to the EU. This 
is illustrated in the fact that affIliates of Japanese companies account for less 
than 20% of the total sales of Japanese goods in Europe (thus, the remaining 
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TABLE 6. Japan's trade with the EU and the Rest of the World 1982 
Through 1990 (Millions of us dollars) 
Japan's Trade With Japan's Trade With The EC Trade 
The EU Rest of the World Balance 
as % of 
World 
Year Exports Imports Balance Exports Imports Balance 
1990 $54,046 $35,338 $18,708 $140,305 $123,347 $16,958 110.3% 
1989 47,986 28,137 19,849 139,934 108,604 31,330 63.4 
1988 47,172 24,163 23,009 137,741 97,365 40,376 57.0 
1987 38,305 17,862 20,443 128,938 80,883 48,055 42.5 
1986 31,122 14,173 16,949 125,441 73,133 52,308 22.5 
1985 21,128 9,371 11,757 106,907 79,418 27,487 37.7 
1984 20,163 9,800 10,363 102,290 84,180 18,110 60.1 
1983 19,457 8,577 10,880 85,949 81,225 4,724 215.5 
1982 18,105 7,946 10,159 82,726 84,780 -2,054 
Averages: 
Year Exports Imports Balance 
1986-90 $43,726 $23,935 $19,794 
1982-85 $19,713 $ 8,924 $10,789 
Notes: The rest of the world excludes the EU as well as regional trade with the other eleven 
Asia Pacific countries. Thus, it includes trade with other countries in Asia, Africa, 
North and South America and non-EU countries in Europe. 
Source: Direction of Trade Statistics, Yearbooks 1991, 1990, and 1989. 
80% are made up of exports). However, in recent years, a growing number 
of Japanese companies have turned to a defensive export substituting 
investment strategy, in part, to defend pre-existing market share against the 
possibility of a discriminatory EU external trade policy. 
Direct investment data for Japanese companies to the EU showed a 
dramatic increase in the late 1980s. According to JETRO, the Japan External 
Trade Organization (1992), during the 1988-1990 period, Japanese direct 
investment in the EU totalled $26.6 billion dollars. During the 1982-84 
period, this investment amounted to only $2.0 billion. A comparison of the 
growth of Japanese direct investment in the EU with Japanese exports to the 
EU between the 1982-84 and 1988-90 periods confirms that Japanese direct 
investment in the EU has progressed more rapidly than trade. While Japanese 
exports to the EU market increased about 3-fold during these two periods, 
direct investment was up about 13-fold. 
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JAPANESE INVESTMENT IN THE EU: 
PRE- AND POST- DEC. 31, 1985 
In 1985, the EU Commission's White Paper, "Completing the Internal 
Market," set in motion the Community's commitment for Europe's single 
market. In an attempt to examine whether this announcement had an impact 
on Japanese market entry strategy for the EU, Japanese direct investment in 
manufacturing facilities was examined for the periods before and after the 
release of the 1985 document. 
TABLE 7. Japanese Manufacturing Vacilities in the EU 
by Period of Establishment and by Country 
April 1972 - Jan 1, 1986 - Jan 1, 1986- Jan 31, 1991 
Country Total Dec 31, 1985 Jan 31, 1991 As a Percent 
of Total 
UK 169 62 107 63.3% 
Gennany 105 59 46 43.8 
France 100 42 58 58.0 
Spain 59 29 30 50.9 
Italy 41 16 25 61.0 
Belgium 30 17 13 43.3 
Netherlands 30 19 11 35.7 
Ireland 23 10 13 56.5 
Portugal 14 7 7 50.0 
Denmark 4 1 3 75.0 
Greece 3 3 0 0.0 
Luxembourg 2 0 2 100.0 
Total EU 580 265 315 54.2% 
Source: Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), 7th Survey of European Operations of 
Japanese Companies in the Manufacturing Sector (March 1991), pp. 124-177. 
The data, reported in Table 7, suggest that Japanese direct investment, as 
measured by the number of manufacturing facilities established, increased in 
the EU in the post December 31, 1985 period. From the establishment of the 
first Japanese manufacturing company in the UK in April 1972, up through 
December 31, 1985, Japanese manufacturers had established only 265 
operations in the EU. By comparison, during the 5 year period, from January 
1, 1986 through January 31, 1991, 315 new manufacturing facilities were 
established. A country-by-country comparison also shows the pattern of 
Japanese manufacturing investment to be very uneven. For example, Japanese 
38 Jurnai Pengurusan 15 
operations increased substantially in the post-1985 period in the United 
Kingdom, and to a lesser extent in Italy and France. For other ED countries, 
Japanese manufacturing investment showed little if any increase in the post-
1985 period. It appears, therefore, that to date the Japanese have viewed the 
United Kingdom as their most attractive site for direct investment entry into 
the single European market. As revealed in Table 7, the number of Japanese 
manufacturing operations established in the D.K. during the post-1985 period 
were 107, compared to only 62 in the 14-year period 1972 up to 1985. 
THE EU STRATEGY OF JAPANESE FIRMS 
As suggested earlier, the evolving external trade policy of the ED can be seen 
as an important factor in moving non-resident companies away from an 
export strategy to either a defensive or offensive exporting substituting 
investment strategy. To test this position, the findings of a recent JETRO 
(1991) survey were reviewed to examine the important motives for Japanese 
companies seeking a physical manufacturing presence in the ED. 
JETRO surveyed 323 Japanese manufacturing companies operating in the 
ED. As Table 8 reveals, the major reasons given for the establishment of a 
physical operation in the ED were part of the firm's overall globalization 
strategy (cited by 235 firms, or 72.8% of the total), to shift from exports to 
local production to meet increased demand (128 firms, 39.6%), concern about 
a rise in protectionism in the ED and/or to avoid discriminatory quantitative 
restrictions on Japanese imports (113 firms, 35.0%), to meet consumer needs 
(94 firms, 29.1%), and to benefit from the expansion of economic activity 
resulting from the single European market (75 firms, 23.2%). 
As indicated in Table 8, about a third of the Japanese manufacturing 
companies surveyed cited protectionism or discriminatory restrictions on 
imports as reasons for establishing operations in the ED. For those firms 
identified as processing and assembly, nearly 60% responded that protectionism 
or discriminatory restrictions were important to their decision to establish an 
operations in the ED. These findings would lend some support to the notion 
that external trade policy surrounding Europe's single market has resulted in 
the adoption of either a defensive or offensive export substituting investment 
strategy for Japanese companies.5 
NON-JAPANESE ASIA PACIFIC COMPANIES IN THE EU 
Data were also examined for other Asia Pacific manufacturing operations in 
the ED. Specifically, information was gathered on manufacturing operations 
in the United Kingdom by country headquarters and by period of establishment. 
According to Invest in Britain Bureau (1991, 1992) information, a total of 42 
Asia Pacific companies from other than Japan could be identified as having. 
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TABLE 8. Motives for Japanese Manufacturing Companies Establishing 
Operations in the EU (323 Companies Surveyed) 
By Industrial Sector 
Processing Parts and Raw 
Motives Total EU and Assembly Components Materials* 
n = 323 n = 137 n = 73 n = 122 
Part of company's 235 101 58 85 
globalization (72.8%) (73.7%) (79.5%) (69.7%) 
strategy. 
To shift from exports 128 70 28 34 
to local production (39.6%) (51.1 %) (38.4%) (27.9) 
to meet increased 
demand. 
Concern about a rise 113 82 28 17 
in protectionism (35.0%) (59.8%) (38.4%) (13.9%) 
and/or avoidance of 
discriminatory 
restrictions on imports. 
To meet consumer 94 47 17 25 
needs. (29.1%) (34.3%) (32.3%) (20.5%) 
To benefit from the 75 35 16 29 
expansion of (23.2%) (25.6%) (21.9%) (23.8%) 
economic activity 
resulting from 
EU integration. 
Notes: Numbers in parenthesis are percentages of total numbers either for the EU or specific 
industrial sectors. 
* Raw materials includes the manufacturing and/or production industries of: foodstuffs, 
textiles, clothing, furniture, pulp and paper, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, rubber products, 
ceramics, stone and clay products, iron and steel, non-ferrous metals, and metal 
products. 
Source: Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), 7th Survey of European Operations of 
Japanese Companies in the Manufacturing Sector (March 1991), p. 17. 
These manufacturing concerns represented companies from Australia, 
Hong Kong, Korea, Taiwan and New Zealand. As shown in Table 9, of the 
42 Asia Pacific companies identified, 35 or 83.3% established their operations 
in the United Kingdom after December 31, 1985. 
Data for these other Asia Pacific companies are similar to the findings 
for Japanese manufacturing companies in the EU, and in particular in the U.K., 
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TABLE 9. Non -Japanese Asia Pacific Manufacturing Facilities in the EU by 
Period of Establishment and by Country 
Country* 
Australia 
Hong Kong 
Korea 
Taiwan 
New Zealand 
Total 
Total 
15 
12 
9 
4 
2 
42 
Pre- Dec 31, 
1985 
1 
5 
0 
1 
0 
7 
Post- Jan 1, Post- Jan 1, 1986 
1986 As a % of Total 
14 93.3% 
7 58.3 
9 100.0 
3 75.0 
2 100.0 
35 83.3% 
Notes: Data for following countries includes the following periods: Australia through April 
1992, Hong Kong through October 1991, Korea through July 1992, Taiwan through 
July 1992, and New Zealand through June 1991. 
* By country of headquarters. 
Source: Various Invest in Britain Bureau publications. 
in that the majority have located after the introduction of the 1985 EU 
document. There data also adds provide support for the contention that the 
single European market is shaping the foreign market entry strategy of other 
Asia Pacific manufacturers. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In the latter half of the 1980s, a number of Asia Pacific countries succeeded 
in penetrating the European market through an export strategy. While Japan 
was a successful net exporter to Europe throughout the 1980s, countries like 
Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and to a lesser extent, Malaysia, Thailand and 
the Philippines became net exporters (or increased their net export position) 
into the European market during the second half of the 1980s. 
As we move through the decade of the 1990s, one of the major 
uncertainties facing Asia Pacific companies emanates from Europe's push for 
a single, integrated market. The possibility that, along with the creation of the 
single market, Europe may intensify barriers to trade which will discriminate 
against non-member countries should be worrying to the Asia Pacific region. 
Specifically, the data examined in this paper suggest that concerns on the 
part of Japanese and other Asia Pacific companies regarding Europe's 
external trade structure may force firms away from an export strategy to the 
establishment of a physical presence in the EU itself. Depending on the 
extend of exports to the EU, these strategies were referred to in this paper as 
either a defensive or offensive export substitution strategy. 
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The evidence presented in this paper suggests that some Japanese 
companies, as well as other Asia Pacific companies, have already begun the 
process of establishing physical operations in the European Community. The 
data show an increase in the establishment of Asia Pacific manufacturing 
facilities since the release of the 1985 EU document on "Completing the 
Internal Market." In the case of Japanese operations their motives, in part, 
were determined by the EU'S external trade policy. 
The advice for Asia Pacific companies which have traditionally exported 
to the EU, those which are recent entrants into the market, or those considering 
the EU for the first time, is that they may wish to assess their market entry 
strategy, in view of the possibility of a European external trade posture which 
could prove detrimental to them. Given the assumption that profitability is 
one of the overriding considerations in strategic decisions, Asia Pacific 
companies wishing to protect, maintain and/or expand their profits in the EU, 
or those looking at the market for the first time, should carefully examine 
their entry strategies into Europe's single-integrated market. 
NOTES 
1. Some countries, like the United States, have expressed more than concern or 
skepticism. In its Omnibus Trade Act (August 1988), the United States wamed that 
it might close its market to firms from countries which discriminate against imports 
from the United States. In 1989, Senator Lloyd Bentsen, Chairman of the Senate 
Finance Committee, indicated that the United States could consider mirror retaliatory 
action if the EU increased trade barriers against the United States as part of Europe 
1992 (The Financial Times, April 8, 1989). 
2. Throughout this paper, the and the EU market refer to the twelve countries that 
currently constitute the community. These twelve countries are: Belgium, Denmark, 
France, (West) Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom. 
3. The acceleration in Pacific Basin trade with the EU appears to have been, in part, 
exchange rate driven. For example, with respect to the geographic breakdown of 
Japanese exports, from 1985 through 1988, the U.S. share fell from 37.2% to 33.8% 
while the EU share rose from 12.0% to 17.7%. During the same period, while the yen 
appreciated 39% against the U.S. dollar, it rose only 8% against the ECU (European 
Currency Unit). 
4. One of the early surveys which supported the organizational response of 
companies to threats of trade barriers was reported by Kelly and Philippatos (1982). 
According to their research, of 108 U.S. multinationals which physically located 
overseas in 1982, 27.6% cited as a major motivation for that decision the desire to 
surmount trade barriers. 
5. A number of sources have documented the changing EU market entry strategies 
of Japanese companies. It has been suggested that Japanese companies have, in part, 
increased their level of direct investment in the EU as a means of dealing with possible 
protectionism and the growing trade friction arising from increasing Japanese exports 
into the EU (Kume 1989 1990; Nomura Research Institute 1989; Industrial Bank of 
Japan 1989; James 1989; Long Term Credit Bank of Japan 1990). The importance 
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of EU protectionism in the market entry decision of Korean companies has also been 
investigated (Young, McDermott and Dunlop 1991). As with Japanese firms, Korean 
organizations have also stepped up their direct investment in the EU in recent years. 
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